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1.Introduction 
An increasing body of work in the philosophy of mind and action has emphasized the 
importance of commitments for joint actions (Cohen & Levesque 1991; Gilbert 1997; 
Michael & Pacherie 2015; Roth, 2004). For instance, Michael and Pacherie (2015) argue 
that commitments facilitate joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the 
uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action 
coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible 
in the first place. In other words, commitments can only play a function in joint action as 
far as the participants, more often than not, comply with their commitments. Arguably, 
such motivation for complying with commitments is connected with the need to belong 
(Fernandez Castro & Pacherie, manuscript), the human need to affiliate with others and 
form long-lasting bonds with them. Such a need is what primarily motivates us to interact 
and engage with those around us and act so as to preserve and reinforce the bonds we 
have forged with them. Other motivational forces may be at work (e.g. care for reputation, 
social emotions, but, arguably, the need to belong is the most basic proximate motivation 
for conforming to commitments and serves as a scaffold for other social motivations. 
 
The need to belong, however, is absent during human-robot interaction (HRI). Empirical 
evidence in psychology suggests that humans do not recognize robots as social peers, or 
at least, humans do not exhibit the same tendencies and prosocial motivations to engage 
with robots that they exhibit when engaging with other humans (Sahaï et al 2017, 2019). 
Thus, we have reasons to believe that the need to belong (NTB for short) is not in place 
during HRI. The lack of NTB motivation during HRI may reintroduce a human-robot 
credibility problem, where the human motivation to comply with their commitments, and 
thus, their credibility is absent. Let us call this problem the human-robot credibility 
problem. 
 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we introduce the human-robot credibility problem 
and show how it can undermine the interaction between human and robots. In particular, 
we argue that the problem is especially challenging when considering how commitments 
are maintained during joint action. Second, we review some recent literature in 
psychology and philosophy of mind in order to draw different strategies that can be used 
in social robotics for overcoming the problem and compensate for the absence of the need 
to belong in HRI.  
 
2.Commitments in Human-Human Interaction  
In order to be characterized as an instance of joint action, the action must be the result of 
a joint intention where joint intention can be characterized as a persistent goal that the 
individual members of the group aim to achieve in a condition of mutual knowledge 
(Cohen and Levesque 1991; Gilbert 1997). Such a condition of mutual knowledge 
establishes that the participants must know that the participants individually intend the 
goal to be achieved and that they will behave as necessary to perform the goal until it is 
achieved. In this sense, in order to engage in a joint action, the participants must be 
committed to achieving the persistent goal (G) as a group or informing their partners that 
the persistent goal is not achievable anymore (Participatory commitments). Furthermore, 
the participants must be contralaterally committed to performing the necessary actions 
and sub-goals to achieve the overall goal (Roth 2004). For instance, acting as expected 
given the appropriate circumstances (e.g. not performing an action that is at odds with the 
goal) or helping the other participants when they have problems to perform a particular 
sub-goal.  
 
Establishing participatory commitments requires the participants involved to generate 
reliable expectations that they intend to do G in order to make mutually manifest their 
readiness to achieve G. In this sense, a straightforward way to establish a commitment is 
to make a promise (Austin, 1975). However, participatory commitments require not only 
that participants be committed but also that they know that their partner is committed too. 
In order to do that, participants often establish the participatory commitments through 
what Clark (2006: 131-133) calls a projective pair (e.g. proposal/acceptance), where one 
of the participants proposes a particular goal (Let’s do G!; Should we do that?) and the 
other can accept or reject it (Ok). Furthermore, there are other mechanisms that can be 
used to generate reliable expectations that one is committed to G. First, if a participant 
exhibits an intention to perform G, the other participant must produce gestures or non-
verbal signals to indicate that she is also committed to G (Siposova 2019). Second, social 
interactions are often mediated by social norms, rules, and scripts that establish a 
participatory commitment. For instance, if I go to a restaurant, the waiters, cooks and I 
assume the persistent joint goal of serving me dinner. In a nutshell, humans use different 
verbal and non-verbal devices to establish participatory commitments to engage in a joint 
action.  
 
However, during the joint action, there is always a risk that one of the participants revises 
her intention and motivations to achieve G and abandon the joint action. Such 
motivational uncertainty would require one to constantly and actively monitor others’ 
intentions and behavior in order to control the risk that the other interactant may partially 
or fully disengage from a task that s/he is performing together with a partner. In this sense, 
a central problem with the maintenance of participatory commitments is the risk of 
instrumental and common ground uncertainty related to contralateral commitments. In 
several circumstances, even when a participatory commitment is established, the 
participants can have different instrumental beliefs about what their contralateral 
commitments regarding the action are. This uncertainty does not only undermine the 
coordination between the two agents, for instance, hindering dyadic and triadic 
adjustments; but also, the perception that one of the participants is violating a contralateral 
commitment can be perceived by the co-actor as a signal of a lack of implication in the 
task or even as a signal that the co-actor refuses to comply with the participatory 
commitment. 
 
In this sense, maintaining participatory commitments partially relies on the monitoring 
and maintenance of contralateral commitments. Participatory commitments require the 
completion of different layers of sub-participatory and contralateral commitments, which 
create a hierarchy of commitments (Clark, 2006: 137-138). Such a hierarchy creates an 
interlocking set of commitments that accumulates different layers of obligations that 
make the participants more motivated to remain engaged in the action, ,thus reducing the 
risk of leaving. Now the question is how do we deal with such contralateral 
commitments?  
 
Often, the contralateral commitments regarding sub-goals and tasks are clear. For 
instance, when there is an asymmetric relation between the participants (e.g. 
boss/employee) that automatically assigns different roles and specifications to the actors. 
Furthermore, individuals exploit different norms of practical rationality that dictates what 
is the most appropriate course of action to commit to given the situation and the general 
participatory commitments. However, even in these situations, especially when the two 
co-actors do not have a history of mutual interactions, each member must display different 
strategies to decide which to contralateral commitments they must comply; but most 
importantly, each member must insure that the other party involved knows what he will 
do in every particular situation in order to coordinate with him.  
 
Participatory and contralateral commitments can be broken for different reasons. First, 
the author of the commitment can fail to perform effectively the relevant action or fail to 
do so at the appropriate time. Second, the recipient of the commitment can over-interpret 
or under-interpret the action. For instance, one may perceive a particular action as an 
instance of the execution of a contralateral commitment when it is not or vice versa. 
Finally, the author may just find different reasons or motivations to renounce to comply 
with the commitment and abandon the task.  
 
To avoid such failures, human participants must deploy monitoring and repair strategies 
that secure the compliance with contralateral commitments. In order to facilitate 
monitoring, humans often employ different ways to signal or anticipate the appropriate 
course of action. First, apart from obvious verbal communication, one may provide 
different gestures and non-verbal signals (ostensive gaze direction) to give reliable clues 
to the other co-actor that one is going to initiate the relevant course of action (Siposova, 
2019). Second, one may use different coordination smoothers, modifications of one's own 
behavior to make it easier for others to predict one's upcoming actions. For an agent can 
exaggerate her movements or reduce the variability of her actions (Vesper et al. 2007). 
 
Facilitating monitoring is not enough to keep our contralateral commitment alive. As we 
mentioned, a participant may consider that the other participant’s course of action is not 
relevant or performed at the appropriate time or maybe she could just perceive that the 
other participant is not acting it as she should. In these occasions, the participants in the 
joint actions must trigger different repair strategies to insure that the co-actor comply with 
her contralateral commitments. As in the case of facilitating monitoring, there are 
different strategies that one may use to repair contralateral commitments. Such strategies 
may differ depending on how the violation of the commitment is committed.  First, when 
the commitment is perceived as a relatively small deviation from what is expected, the 
recipient of the commitment may just attempt to display implicit repair strategies, for 
instance, to compensate for the deviation himself (e.g. displaying a helping behavior) or 
to automatically express negative emotions about the outcomes of other participants’ 
actions in order to motivate a change of the course of action (Michael 2011). However, 
when the perceived deviation is larger, the repair strategies could become more explicit. 
For instance, protesting, reprimanding or asking for explanations (Roth 2005). 
 
Similarly, the reactions of the author of the violations to the repair strategies could differ 
depending on the type of strategies. While the reaction to implicit repair could be to 
(automatically or intentionally) compensate her behavior, more explicit repair strategies 
may provoke explicit reaction such as apologizing and intentional compensation. 
However, in some cases, we can expect the author of the commitment to openly explain 
or discuss what he is doing, which can lead to a re-negotiation to the commitment in place 
that could end up with an acceptance, rejection or counter-proposal by the recipient (Clark 
2006). 
 
At this point, it is worth mentioning that monitoring and repair presuppose, contrary to 
other psychological devices (see Székely & Michael, 2018), a certain normative force. 
For instance, when two participants establish a commitment they are automatically 
entitled to reprimand or sanction the other when the other abandon the task (see Gilbert, 
1997), but also, entitled to monitor what the other is doing in the context of the joint task. 
However, monitoring and repair have important cognitive and behavioral costs. For 
instance, reprimanding for not complying with his contralateral commitments could have 
negative consequences for the socio-affiliative relation between the participants. So why 
do we engage in such strategies in spite of their potential negative consequences for the 
interaction itself?  
 
The answer must be found in the pro-social tendency to engage in social interactions 
embodied in the need to belong. Human beings exhibit a need to affiliate with others and 
form long-lasting bonds with them. Such a need is what primarily motivates us to interact 
and engage with those around us and act so as to preserve and reinforce the bonds we 
have forged with them. But also, it is the more basic proximate motivation for conforming 
to commitments, and thus, for deploying the necessary strategies for maintaining them 
alive. Our disposition to perceive social interactions as intrinsically rewarding may 
compensate for the possible costs of monitoring and repair. 
 
3. Commitments in Human-Robot Interaction  
In the previous sections, we have presented different strategies that humans exhibit for 
establishing and maintaining participatory and contralateral commitments in joint action. 
In this section, we would like to envisage a possible problem that the maintenance of 
commitments may generate in human-robot interactions. This problem, we argue, poses 
a general challenge to roboticists whose goal is to build robots capable of interacting 
cooperatively with humans; that is, the challenge of dealing with different sources of 
opacity and with the resistance of the human participant to display reparative behaviors. 
 
In the previous section, we argued that a successful joint action requires co-agents to 
maintain different contralateral commitments that facilitate the maintenance of the 
participatory commitment to a persistent overall joint goal. This involves not only making 
the intentions to perform the goal mutually manifest but also monitoring and repairing 
such contralateral commitments. These strategies presuppose a pro-social motivation that 
offsets the possible costs associated with the strategies. For instance, humans must find 
social interactions rewarding and pleasant in order to be ready to assume the costs of 
being entitled to sanctions or being ready to provide social cues that facilitate the 
monitoring of their own actions.   
However, a number of findings in psychology and neurosciences suggest that humans 
interact differently when their partner is a robot rather than a human. (Sahaï et al. 2017, 
2019; Wiese et al. 2017). To give an example, while different studies in neurosciences 
indicate that humans can recruit different motor simulation mechanisms to understand 
others’ behavior even during passive observation of others (Elsner et al., 2012 Manera et 
al., 2011), studies with PET suggest that humans predictive neurological devices are not 
responsive to non-human generated actions (Perani et al. 2001; Tai et al. 2004).  
Although the reasons for these differences could be diverse, we believe that the fact that 
humans do not recognize robots as social peers would automatically inhibit prosocial 
dispositions associated to the need to belong, and thus, the central motivations to deploy 
different socio-cognitive capacities we often exercise in social encounters with human 
partners.  
 
The lack of the need to belong and the prosocial tendencies associated with it during HRI 
poses two sources of difficulties and challenges for social roboticists. First, from the robot 
perspective, the lack of need to belong motivation or pro-social behavior on the part of 
the human can be an important source of opacity. Human’s lack of affiliative motivation 
may produce resistance to be cooperative but also to provide the type of social cues that 
facilitate monitoring during the interaction. Furthermore, the lack of prosocial motivation 
can make the human participant more intransigent with the robot's failures or 
inappropriate behaviors which would increase the risk of abandoning the joint task. 
Second, from the human perspective, given the robot’s underperformance and 
overperformance of the task, there is another source of opacity that it is difficult to 
compensate with reparatory strategies if the human lacks the prosocial motivation to 
trigger them.  
 
These sources of difficulties are amplified by other specific features of HRI. To see how, 
notice that an important number of HRI presuppose an asymmetric relation between the 
two participants where the robot is a helper or servant and the human is the boss or figure 
of authority. This asymmetry could reinforce some of the factors presented above, for 
instance, the resistance on the part of the human to provide social cues to help the robot 
monitors her commitments.  Even in cases where the robot is the figure of authority (e.g. 
therapeutic environments), human resistance to perceive and recognize the robot as an 
agent with whom to create a long-standing relation may provoke fatal failures in the 
interaction.  
 
In a nutshell, HRI interactions exhibit certain features that are absent in HHI. The fact 
that humans may not recognize the robot as a peer may inhibit their affiliative tendencies 
which amplify the asymmetry of the interaction and may reduce the tendency of the 
human to comply with their commitments. This imposes different problems for social 
roboticists. First, the robot will receive fewer social cues to facilitate its monitoring. 
Second, the opacity of its behavior and the lack of affiliative tendencies in the human 
may result in the human making fewer reparative behaviors to facilitate comprehension 
by the robot. 
 
4. How to Solve the Human-Robot Credibility Problem: Some preliminary 
strategies 
Addressing the challenges presented above requires focusing on two different tasks: 
improving monitoring for both the human and the robot co-actors and providing the robot 
with accurate devices for displaying reparatory behaviors when the human or itself fails 
to comply with a commitment.  
 
Improving transparency and monitoring during HRI requires making robots able to 
reliably produce and understand social signals. The objective of creating robots which 
produce social signals can be instantiated in different ways. For instance, Glas et al (2016) 
and Nishio et al. (2007) attempt to create robots that look and act like humans, while other 
researchers (Zecca et al. 2004) have concentrated on imitating the biomechanics of human 
movements rather than making their appearance human like. However, mechanisms for 
social signaling do not requires imitating human sociality or providing sophisticated 
expressions. For instance, (Triebel et al. 2016) equipped Spencer, a socially aware 
service robot for passenger guidance, with the capacity for anticipating his next 
movement by looking at the direction he is going to take before he does. Providing 
robots with more sophisticated mechanisms of detection is the other key aspect for 
improving transparency. In this respect, there have been important advances in the 
development of more robust actions or emotions recognition in robots in the last years 
(Hoffman & Breazeal, 2007; Karg et al. 2013; Koppula & Saxena, 2013; Palinko et al. 
2014). In a nutshell, the current state of the art in robotics allows us to be optimistic 
regarding the implementation of this type of strategies for transparency and elicitation of 
social behavior.  
However, social robotics, but also research in human-human interactions, often overlook 
the importance of repair during joint action. As we understand it, the notion of repair is 
intimately related to the normative aspect of commitments. The way we respond to others 
violation of their commitments often implies a normative attitude which implies holding 
the other on demand of what he must do. To understand this aspect, consider the 
distinction between normative and descriptive expectations (Greenspan 1978; Paprzycka 
1999; Wallace 1998). Descriptive expectations are tied to the notion of prediction and 
their violation or frustration does not necessarily triggers reactive attitudes. For example, 
you can expect your friend to have a beer because this is what she always does but if she 
does not, this may surprise you but not bother you. However, normative expectations are 
connected to the idea of holding someone on demand and their frustration triggers 
reactive attitudes like blame, request for justification or sanctions. In other word, the 
normal response to a violation of a normative expectation is to impose a negative reaction 
to the other agent for not acting as expected. Such negative reactions are more 
emotionally loaded and directed to regulate the others behavior. For instance, you can 
feel entitled to sanction your friend when he frustrates your expectation that he will cede 
his seat to an older person on the subway. Such a normative attitude is also intrinsic to 
joint action and commitments (Gilbert 2009; Roth 2004). In fact, some recent studies 
suggest that people who judge that two persons are walking together in certain conditions 
were more likely to judge that one of the participant has the right to rebuke the other when 
he peels off  (Gomez-Lavin and Rachar 2018). In other words, sanctions and repairs are 
pivotal responses to violation of commitments, and thus, social robotics must consider 
them in its general strategy to avoid the problems  associated to the develop of HRI.  
In section 2, we discussed several strategies aimed at insuring that the co-actor complies 
with her commitments. Those strategies include more implicit strategies like 
compensation or emotional responses; and more explicit strategies like reprimanding or 
protesting. Now, the question is whether we could redeploy the repair strategies that 
human display during interaction in HRI. Given the difficulties reviewed above regarding 
the lack of need to belong during HRI, focusing on repair strategies must be an important 
ally for improving the interaction between humans and robots. Expectably, the specific 
sources of prosocial motivation and opacity that emerge during HRI could be 
compensated by designing robots able to display repair strategies to avoid the break-up 
of commitments. 
 
However, the question of how we can equip robots with repair devices leads to two basic 
problems. First, as in the case of monitoring, when the robot is the author of the 
commitment but fails to perform the expected action, it would have to be made sensitive 
to the emotional reactions of its human partner to engage in reparative behavior or to 
detect when the human has engaged into compensatory strategies. This would require 
building robots with more robust mechanisms for understanding human emotions and 
behavior. Second, when the robot is the recipient of the commitment, we must be careful 
of the reparative strategies he recruits. After all, given that humans are often the 
authoritative figure during the interaction, certain repair actions could be perceived by 
the human co-actor as damaging or threatening.  
 
